Some historians have been critical of the British Army’s performance during World War II, accusing the infantry in particular of using outdated tactics and training methods. This may have been true in the early days of the War, but after Dunkirk, the Army made a concerted effort to improve training and update tactics. By D-Day, the rifle platoon was a well-trained, effective fighting unit with a flexible structure and a variety of weapons sufficient for most situations.
One of the biggest challenges facing the British Expeditionary Force when it was sent to France in 1939 is that two of its platoon-level weapons, the Bren light machine gun and the 2-inch mortar, had only recently been adopted and had not been fully assimilated and understood. Additionally, a revised platoon structure had only just been implemented along with the new weapons. It is hardly surprising, then, that the infantry under-performed against the Germans in 1940. These issues had to be addressed before the Army could attempt to invade occupied Europe.
In the period after Dunkirk, the Army significantly revised its training program, with an increased emphasis on both realism and aggressiveness. A new infantry training manual was published in 1944 that was far more sophisticated than previous versions; this updated manual included a number of battle drills, intended to give the platoon commander and his soldiers standardized, rehearsed responses to likely tactical situations. Senior leadership was initially resistant to the idea of battle drills, expressing concern that they would stifle the initiative of the platoon commander and his section leaders. Actual combat experience, however, demonstrated the value of the drills; it was far easier to fall back on the rehearsed drill when under stress than to come up with a new and untested solution.
A platoon should work like a pack of hounds and not like a flock of sheep.
Infantry Training
Part VIII. – Fieldcraft, Battle Drill, Section and Platoon Tactics (1944)
Regardless of the specific situation, certain rules were always to be applied. Covering fire was necessary to allow others to move, and an assault on the enemy’s flank was always better than a direct attack. The following is a summary of some of the most common approaches to tactical problems.
The platoon’s tactics and maneuvers were based on those of the rifle section, but on a larger scale. When advancing without the likelihood of contact with the enemy, the infantry typically marched on a road, as it was faster than movement across country. Each section marched on an alternate side of the road, the men in single file, spaced about five yards apart from each other. The lead section was followed by platoon headquarters, then the other two sections. Platoon commanders were reminded that they, too, were to avoid the middle of the road, despite their preference to be readily seen by their men. This staggered pattern was called the “A.A. formation”, as it was intended to reduce the likelihood of being observed from the air.
Movement across country depended on the type of ground and whether enemy contact was expected; it was vital for the platoon commander to study his map, and if possible, reconnoiter the terrain ahead, to help him determine his line of advance. One common formation was a large arrowhead, with a lead section and two flanking sections; each section also forming its own arrowhead. A similar formation was to have the lead section in an arrowhead, but with the following sections in single file or loose file. In dense country, or when infiltrating the enemy, single file was found to be the best formation; the drawback being the file could become quite long and the commander had a harder time observing and controlling his platoon. Whatever the formation, the platoon leader and his headquarters would normally be in the center.
Should the lead section come under enemy fire, the men were to immediately go to ground, then crawl to a new position and return fire.
Slogan: “Down-Crawl-Observe-Sights-FIRE”
Infantry Training
Part VIII. – Fieldcraft, Battle Drill, Section and Platoon Tactics (1944)
The platoon commander would assess the situation and determine a course of action. While the lead section maintained fire, one or both of the following sections could be sent on a flanking maneuver to attack the enemy. If only one section was sent flanking, the other could either add suppressing fire or be held in reserve. If the enemy was encountered in large numbers, the platoon runner could be sent to request help from the rest of the company; alternatively, the platoon could withdraw, with the sections moving in alternating bounds. Whether advancing or retreating while in contact with the enemy, it was always essential that one section provide fire while the others were moving.
When making a deliberate attack, the sections would advance, again by alternating bounds, until they were in a position to launch their assault. One section would be designated to provide suppressing fire, while another assaulted the enemy’s flank. The platoon’s 2-inch mortar could use high explosive rounds to contribute to the suppressing fire, but was more often used to create a smoke screen to conceal the assaulting troops. Finally, the third section was designated the “cut-off section”, which would maneuver to the enemy’s rear to either prevent the enemy from retreating, or else engage any reinforcements.
For urban combat, or “fighting in built-up areas”, the platoon was often restructured by detaching the Bren guns from their sections. The Bren was too heavy and cumbersome for house-clearing, but two or three grouped together could turn a street into a killing zone. With the Bren detached, the rest of the section became known as the clearing group. The Sten carbine was the ideal close-quarters weapon, but grenades and bayonets were also used. The clearing group would force entry at a door or window; whenever possible, they would rush to the top of the stairs and clear each floor in turn, working from the top down. The clearing groups of the three sections would alternate clearing the buildings; alternatively, one group could be held in reserve, saving their strength for assaulting an enemy strongpoint. The clearing groups were instructed to avoid the street, but instead use alleys and back gardens to move from house to house. As always, the platoon’s 2-inch mortar was primarily used to create smoke screens. However, a good 2-inch mortarman could also lob high explosive bombs through windows or into back gardens; unlike larger mortars, the rounds could not penetrate roofs or walls. A small village could often be cleared by a single platoon; in a larger village or town, the platoon used the same methods in conjunction with the rest of the company.
Anti-tank weapons were officially allocated at the company level, but it was quite common for one to be attached to a platoon. At the outbreak of war, this was the .55-inch Boyes anti-tank rifle, which was quickly determined inadequate for the task. This was replaced in 1943 with the Projector, Infantry Anti-Tank, or PIAT. The PIAT was heavy and awkward, difficult to reload, and had a short effective range; officially its range was 115 yards, but in actual experience it was found that accuracy suffered after 50 yards. Despite the deficiencies of the launcher itself, the projectile weighed two-and-a-half-pounds and utilized the shaped-charge principle, making it effective against most enemy armored vehicles; it was also very useful against pillboxes and other reinforced structures.
Because of the PIAT’s limitations, it was most effective when used as an ambush weapon. The rifle platoon could assist in an anti-tank ambush by engaging any supporting infantry as well as forcing the tank crew to take cover inside the vehicle, reducing their observational ability; a Bren gun would often be assigned to fire at the tank’s vision ports. As usual, the 2-inch mortar provided a smoke screen.
When assaulting a pillbox or other reinforced position, engineers or pioneers (specially-trained assault infantry) were attached to the platoon. The designated fire section would suppress the occupants of the pillbox by aiming at the firing slits and loopholes; this section was typically joined by platoon HQ. The 2-inch mortar would fire smoke rounds to blind the enemy. The other two sections, along with the engineers and PIAT, would advance toward the pillbox. The fire section continued firing; the Bren on its bipod was effective at firing at a fixed point even through the smoke. The PIAT would find a position to start adding its fire, possibly added by the Brens of the assault sections. Next, the engineers or pioneers cleared a path through any minefields or barbed wire using bangalore torpedoes, explosive charges designed specifically for such a task. The second section would rush through the gap and assault any enemy troops found entrenched outside the pillbox. Once the supporting enemy was neutralized, that section became the cut-off group, as previously described. The third section and engineers followed through the gap; as the pillbox door was typically heavy steel, the engineers needed to place breaching charges. Once the door was blown, the third section, or clearing group, assaulted the pillbox. While the clearing group was securing the pillbox, the fire section moved up and joined the cut-off group.
British doctrine placed a high value on consolidation after the assault; in other words, once the enemy had been cleared from a position, it was vital for the platoon to reorganize and prepare for the next engagement. The wounded had to be bandaged and sent to the rear, along with any prisoners; ammunition was redistributed and magazines filled. The Germans were adept at quickly recovering from being assaulted and launching a counter-attack; the British platoon had to be ready to defend. Another favorite German tactic was to feign retreat and draw over-enthusiastic troops into an ambush. The British would therefore occupy the enemy’s abandoned positions, then dig their own as time allowed. The men were tired and somewhat disoriented after making their assault; it took an energetic officer to motivate them into consolidating. While often criticized by the Americans, this British focus on consolidation applied to all formations, not just platoons, and was based on experience in both World Wars. For the British, consolidation always took priority over exploitation and pursuit, and was intended to reduce casualties and avoid being caught off-guard.
While World War II was a largely mechanized conflict often characterized by long advances, British soldiers still found themselves digging trenches. Far more men were killed or wounded by artillery and mortar fire than rifles or machine guns; the only sure defense was to get in the ground. Instead of the large entrenchments of the previous war, defensive positions were based on small 2- or 3-man slit trenches, placed in such a way as to provide each other supporting fire. Each section’s Bren group was typically placed covering the section’s flank, with the L.M.G. sited at the apex of an angled trench. A platoon on its own would typically form a triangle with the three sections, able to provide all-around defense; as part of a larger formation, the platoon was more likely to form an extended line.
Even when generally advancing, the infantry prepared simple trenches any time a halt was called; this was necessary for any enemy counter-attack or barrage. In defensive operations, the trenches were more complex, with the parapets camouflaged with local foliage, and a sump dug to drain away rainwater. The 1944 training manual stated that overhead protection was not to be added, so that infantrymen could fire on enemy aircraft; combat experience, however, contradicted this instruction. Overhead cover often had to be improvised; whenever possible, doors and shutters were taken from nearby buildings, but other materials included broken-down ration crates and even airborne resupply containers. Earth was then piled on top of the roof to give added protection from shrapnel, with enough of a gap left to allow the soldier to look out and fire his weapon.
Weapons, tactics and structures changed little in the immediate postwar years. Tony Thorne was conscripted as a private soldier under the National Service program, but then underwent officer cadet training and was given a commission. While his memoirs were intended as humorous, they seem to reflect something of a loss in the infantry’s sophistication.
Platoon commanders only really do one thing in wartime, or certainly on exercise, and that is “the platoon in attack”. The manuals don’t devote much space to “the platoon in retreat”, so we just had to practice platoon in attack until we were blue in the face.
The platoon commander, second lieutenant, deploys his three sections in preparation for attack. Each section is commanded by a corporal and each section has a two-man Bren gun team. The Bren gun team should have the basic skills to fire the gun and is usually under the command of a lance corporal or a very trusted private soldier. According to the topography, two sections are deployed either to the right or the left of the third section, which retains the services of the dashing young subaltern. The two sections then dig in and select their firing positions. Usually this is supervised by the platoon sergeant, who remains in overall command of the firing squad. The third section then sets off in the direction of the enemy position, usually employing “the leopard crawl”. When the platoon commander’s section gets within a short sprint of the enemy, the sergeant orders the other two sections to open up rapid fire, preferably on the enemy. As a hail of fire pours into the enemy position, the platoon commander breaks cover and, usually brandishing a pistol and crying out Henry V’s speech at Agincourt, he leads his section, who have fixed bayonets, in a furious attack on the enemy. At this point the firing squad is supposed to maintain the level of fire to keep the maximum pressure on the enemy, but the arc of fire should move slightly to the right or left, according to the direction of the platoon commander’s charge, so as to avoid striking your own men. After a brief hand-to-hand combat, the enemy is wiped out and the subaltern gets the MC.
Needless to say, it doesn’t always work out this way.
Tony Thorne
Brasso, Blanco and Bull
Sources
Infantry Training
Part VIII. – Fieldcraft, Battle Drill, Section and Platoon Tactics (1944)
His Majesty’s Stationary Office
Military Training Pamphlet No. 55: Fighting in Built-Up Areas (1943)
His Majesty’s Stationary Office
Reprinted by The Naval & Military Press Ltd.
Small Arms Training, Volume I, Pamphlet No. 8: Mortar (2-inch) (1939)
His Majesty’s Stationary Office
Small Arms Training, Volume I, Pamphlet No. 24: Projector, Infantry, Anti-Tank (PIAT) (1943)
His Majesty’s Stationary Office
Bull, Stephen and Rottman, Gordon L.
Infantry Tactics of the Second World War
Osprey Publishing, Ltd., 2008
Forty, George
British Army Handbook, 1939 – 1945
Sutton Publishing, 1998
French, David
Raising Churchill’s Army: The British Army and the War Against Germany, 1919 – 1945
Oxford University Press, 2000
Harrison Place, Timothy
Military Training in the British Army, 1940 – 1944: From Dunkirk to D-Day
Frank Cass Publishers, 2000
Thorne, Tony
Brasso, Blanco & Bull
Constable & Robinson, Ltd., 1998
Colour Sergeant Tombstone's History Pages 